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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose quantum position-verification schemes where all the channels are untrusted 
except the position of the prover and distant reference stations of verifiers. We review and analyze the 
existing QPV schemes containing some pre-shared data between the prover and verifiers. Most of these 
schemes are based on non-cryptographic assumptions, that is, quantum/classical channels between the 
verifiers are secure. It seems impractical in the environment fully controlled by adversaries and would 
lead to security compromise in practical implementations. However, our proposed formulism for quantum 
position-verification is more robust, secure and according to the standard assumptions of cryptography. 
Furthermore, once the position of the prover is verified, our schemes establish secret keys in parallel and 
can be used for authentication and secret communication between the prover and verifiers.  
 
1. Introduction 
The central task of position-based cryptography is position-verification. A prover proves to a set of 
verifiers located at certain distant reference stations that he/she is indeed at a specific position [1]. 
Unconditional security in classical PBC is impossible because of cloning. The eavesdroppers can copy 
classical information, manipulate and get desired results before an honest prover. Recently, many authors 
tried to achieve information-theoretically secure position-based cryptography in quantum settings [2-9]. 
However, Buhrman et al showed that all proposed quantum position-verification schemes are insecure. 
They proved that position-verification is impossible if the position of the prover is his only credential and 
he does not have any advantage over eavesdroppers beyond his position while eavesdroppers are allowed 
to share an arbitrarily large entanglement [8]. They showed that the security of any position-based 
quantum cryptographic scheme can be destroyed by eavesdroppers through teleporting quantum states 
back and forth and performing instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation, an idea introduced by 
Vaidman [10]. However, they proved that if eavesdroppers do not share any entanglement (NO-PE 
model), then secure PBQC is possible. Furthermore, S. Beigi and R. Konig showed that if eavesdroppers 
posses an exponential (in n) amount of entanglement then they can successfully attack any PBQC scheme 
where verifiers share secret n-bit string [11].  
In the search of unconditional security, some authors proposed that secure PBQC is possible if the 
prover and the verifiers pre-share some data [7-9]. However, we will show in section IV that these 
schemes will remain no more secure if channels between the distant verifiers are insecure. In this paper, 
we propose that position-based quantum cryptography can be made unconditionally secure even over 
untrusted networks through entanglement swapping [12]. In our proposed schemes, only position of the 
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prover and the reference stations are secure from adversary while all channels between them are insecure. 
The only advantage honest prover has over eavesdroppers is publically known pre-shared entangled states 
with the verifiers. These entangled states can be shared through a source between them that emits labeled 
pairs of entangled qubits (photons in our case). Furthermore, our schemes require only quantum channels 
where adversaries can easily be detected by quantum measurement principal and quantum no-cloning 
theorem [13]. If our QPV schemes are carried out for N times successively and no adversaries are 
detected, same schemes establish secret keys and can be used for authentication and secret information 
transfer between the prover and verifiers. Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we start with the 
introduction of quantum position-verification, while the protocol most often used in different QPV 
schemes, entanglement swapping, is described in section 3. We review existing QPV schemes and 
analyze them in standard cryptographic settings in section 4, and in section 5 we present our proposed 
QPV schemes.  In section 6 and 7, we extend our QPV schemes to position-based key generation and 
position-based authentication respectively. Finally, we analyze our schemes under known attacks in 
section 8 and summarize the paper in section 9.  
 
2. Introduction to quantum position-verification 
In a general position-verification scheme, an honest prover located at a specified position convinces a set 
of N verifiers at distant reference stations that he/she is indeed at the specific position. Different verifiers 
send a secret message and a key to decrypt that message in pieces, that is, each verifier sends a bit of key 
to P such that all the key bits and the message arrive at the position of P concurrently. If P decrypts the 
message correctly and sends the result to all verifiers in time, position-verification scheme will enable the 
verifiers to verify his position jointly. But if one or a set of dishonest provers, not at the specified 
position, intercept the communication and try to convince verifiers that they are at the specified position, 
a secure position-verification scheme will enable the verifiers to reject it with high probability. Such 
secure position-verification is impossible in classical cryptography because of cloning but quantum 
measurement principle and quantum no-cloning theorem can help in developing secure position-
verification schemes. To introduce the idea of quantum position-verification in detail, we will review the 
basic 1-round QPV scheme PVBB84 based on the BB84 encoding [14]. More detailed analysis of this 
scheme can be found in [8].  Explicit procedure of the scheme for two verifiers follows: 
1). V0 prepares two secret random bits [ ]1,0, ∈yx  and sends them to V1 through secure channel between 
them.  
2). V0 prepares the qubit xH y  and sends it to P. Concurrently, V1 sends the bit y to P such that xH y  
and y arrive at the same time at P. 
3). P measures the qubit in basis y and sends the result to both V0 and V1 immediately.  
4). V0 and V1 can verify the position of P by confirming the validity of the result and comparing the 
arrival time of response. 
The authors showed that this scheme is secure only in the No-Pre-shared Entanglement (No-PE) 
model, where the adversaries do not have pre-shared entangled quantum data but have full power of 
quantum computing [8]. This scheme can easily be generalized to higher dimensions where multiple 
verifiers send secret information to P in pieces. 
  
3. Entanglement swapping 
Entanglement swapping [12] is an interesting extension of teleportation [15], in fact, teleportation of 
entanglement. It causes two quantum particles to become nonlocally correlated even if they have never 
interacted. Let Alice posses two particles 1 and 2 and Bob has particle 3 while Charlie keeps particle 4 in 
his possession. Moreover, suppose Bob and Charlie never met with each other (particles 3 and 4 are 
initially uncorrelated) but Bob’s particle 3 is entangled with Alice’s particle 1 while Charlie’s particle 4 is 
entangled with Alice’s particle 2 in one of Bell’s state: 
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By performing Bell state measurement [16] on her particles 1 and 2, Alice can project Bob and Charlie’s 
particles (3 and 4) into one of the four possible Bell states:   
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(3.3) 
Initially, entangled pairs were (1,3) and (2,4). But after BSM by Alice, irrespective of outcome, entangled 
pairs are (1,2) and (3,4). One can say that particles 3 and 4, initially uncorrelated, become nonlocally 
correlated through entanglement swapping. In order to complete the protocol, Alice will have to 
communicate two classical bits (say) to Bob, who can then share a definite bell state 
43uu
β   with Charlie 
after applying suitable unitary local transformations. If initial Bell sates of entangled pair (1,3) and (2,4) 
are known to Alice, she will be certain about the Bell state of pair (3,4) after performing BSM on qubits 1 
and 2. For example, if initial Bell states of entangled pairs (1,3) and (2,4) were 01β  and 00β  and 
Alice measure particles 1 and 2 in the state 10β , then particles 3 and 4 will be entangled in state 11β . 
Detailed calculations can be found in appendix. All possible BSM results of Alice and corresponding Bell 
states of particles 3 and 4 are summarized in table 1. For simplicity, we will write jiuuβ  as jiuu  from 
now on.  
Table 1: This table shows all possible initial states of particles 1-4 and corresponding outcomes of BSM 
on particles 1 and 2. For example, if initial entangled pairs (1,3) and  (2,4) were both in states 00 then 
after BSM on 1 and 2, new entangled pairs (1,2) and (3,4) would be in one of the possible Bell sates: 00 
and 00, 01 and 01, 10 and 10, 11 and 11.   
4231 uuuu ⊗  
---------------------------------------- 
4321 uuuu ⊗  
---------------------------------------- 
0000 0101 1010 1111 0000 0101 1010 1111 
0001 0100 1011 1110 0001 0100 1011 1110 
0010 0111 1000 1101 0010 0111 1000 1101 
0011 0110 1001 1100 0011 0110 1001 1100 
 
4. Existing QPV schemes containing pre-shared data 
For simplicity, we will discuss all the existing schemes in one dimension. Higher dimensional 
generalization of these schemes is straightforward and can be found in corresponding references. First we 
will review these schemes under their proposed assumptions while in our analysis of these schemes; we 
will consider the standard assumptions of cryptography. That is, eavesdroppers have full control over 
environment except position of the prover and reference stations. They have unlimited power of 
receiving, transmitting and manipulating quantum and classical information in no time. Furthermore, they 
can jam the communication between the honest prover and verifiers.  
 
4.1. QPV scheme-I 
A. Kent proposed that secure quantum position-verification is possible if the prover and one of the 
verifiers pre-share some classical bit string unknown to eavesdroppers [7]. This secret data can be then 
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used as a secret key to authenticate the communication. The prover and the verifier can generate longer 
key .........210 kkk through quantum key expansion protocol. Moreover, other verifiers still need to 
communicate some secret information publically with P. The scheme is outlined below: 
1).V0 and V1 send randomly chosen bits xi and yi from their classical strings x and y respectively. They 
send this data to P such that these bits arrive at P in pairs, that is, x1 and y1 arrive simultaneously, then x2 
and y2, and so on.  
2). P retrieves the key bit 
ii yxik ++24  and sends this bit to both V0 and V1 simultaneously.  
3). V0 can verify the position of P if key bit is correct and arrived in time. If P succeeds N times by 
sending correct bit, V0 authenticates the position of P.  
This scheme seems secure but impractical because security of this scheme is based on pre-shared 
classical secret key which can be expanded through quantum key distribution.  
 
4.2. QPV scheme-II 
Buhrman et al proposed a scheme, ε 84BBPV  EPR version, where one of the verifiers shares an entangled 
state with the prover [8]. The scheme also requires a secret bit string shared between the verifiers who 
send this secret information to the prover publically. In one dimension, the scheme is given below: 
1). V0 prepares secret random bit [ ]1,0∈y  and sends to V1 through secure channel between them.  
2). V0 prepares a two qubit Bell state, keeps one qubit and sends other to P. Simultaneously, V1 sends bit y 
to P such that both entangled qubit and y reach at P at the same time. 
3). P measures the qubit in basis y and sends the result to both V0 and V1 immediately. 
4) When measurement result of P arrives, V0 then measures his qubit and sends the result to V1 through 
secure channel. 
5). V0 and V1 can verify the position of P by confirming the validity of the result and comparing the 
arrival time of response. 
Again this scheme is secure only in the No-PE model. In the cryptographic environment where 
eavesdroppers can possess and share arbitrarily large entangled states, security can be spoofed. Detailed 
security analysis and higher dimensional version of this scheme can be found in [8].  
 
4.3. QPV scheme-III 
R. Malaney, proposed a large class of quantum position-verification schemes where different distant 
verifiers and the prover share entangled data. His work was granted US patent in 2012 [9]. One of his 
QPV schemes based on entanglement swapping proceeds as below: 
1). Let V0 posses an entangled qubit pair (1, 2) and V1 posses an entangled qubit pair (3, 4) in one of the 
four Bell states, for instance both in 11. 
2). At time t0, V0 sends qubit 2 to P and at time t1, V1 sends qubit 3 to P through public channels.    
3). P performs a BSM on qubits 2 and 3 and gets one of the Bell states, say 10. This measurement projects 
the qubits 1 and 4 into Bell state 10, only known to P at the moment. P immediately sends his 
measurement result to both V0 and V1 simultaneously.   
4). Suppose V0 and V1 receive the BSM result from P at time T0 and T1 respectively. V1 immediately 
transmits his qubit 4, time T1 and BSM result to V0 through secure public channel between them.  
5). V0 performs BSM on qubit 1 and 4 and confirms that his result (10) is consistent with that of P. 
6). V0 and V1 can verify the position of P if times T0-t0 and T1-t1 are consistent with the position of P.   
Unconditional security of this scheme is based on unreal assumption that channels between 
distant verifiers are secure. If channels between the verifiers are not secure, adversaries can easily break 
this scheme. They can intercept qubits 2 and 3, process them and can get the secret BSM result from P. 
Moreover, both V0 and V1 cannot detect the presence of adversaries in this scheme. Cheating scheme by 
adversaries is shown in figure 1 and is described below: 
1). Let V0 possesses an entangled qubit pair (1, 2) and V1 possesses an entangled qubit pair (3, 4) in one 
of the four Bell states, for instance both in 11. Moreover, suppose eavesdropper E0 lying between V0 and 
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P possesses entangled qubit pair (5, 6) in Bell state 00 while eavesdropper E1 lying between V1 and P 
have entangled qubit pair (7, 8) also in Bell state 00.  
2). At time t0, V0 sends qubit 2 to P but E0 intercepts it and sends her qubit 6 to P. Similarly at time t1, V1 
sends qubit 3 to P but E1 intercepts it and sends her qubit 8 to P. Simultaneously, E1 sends qubit 7 to E0.    
3). P performs a BSM on qubits 6 and 8 and gets one of the Bell states, say 10. This measurement projects 
the qubits 5 and 7 into Bell state 10, only known to P at the moment. P immediately sends his 
measurement result to both V0 and V1 simultaneously.   
4). V0 and V1 will receive the BSM result from P at times T0 and T1 as if no adversary is happened. V1 
immediately transmits his qubit 4, time T1 and BSM result to V0 but E0 intercepts, as the channel between 
them is not secure. E0 performs BSM on qubit 5 and 7 and gets 10. Then he applies unitary 
transformations on qubit 2 such that qubits 1 and 2 get entangled in the state 10, and sends it to V0.  
5). V0 will perform BSM on qubit 1 and 2 and confirm that his result is consistent with that of P.  
6). Both V0 and V1 will verify the position of P, as if no adversary has happened, as times T0-t0 and T1-t1 
are consistent with the position of P. 
Since the measurements and timing of eavesdroppers are exactly the same as those of the honest 
prover, verifiers V0 and V1 cannot differentiate between the honest prover P at a certain position and 
eavesdroppers at different positions. Hence, eavesdroppers cheat the prover and verifiers without being 
detected.  
 
Figure 1: Cheating scheme for QPV scheme-III. 
 
4.4. QPV scheme-IV 
R. Malani proposed another QPV scheme based on entanglement swapping [9]. This scheme is described 
as follows: 
1). V0 shares two entangled qubit pairs (1, 2) and (3, 4) with the prover P, in one of the four Bell states, 
for instance both in 00. Suppose he also shares an entangled qubit pair (5, 6) with Bob in the Bell state 11.  
All this information is public.  
2). V0 performs a BSM on qubits 3 and 5 and gets one of the Bell states, say 01. This measurement 
projects the qubits 4 and 6 into 10, only known to V0.   
3). V0 communicates with V1 through a secure public channel between them and informs him about his 
BSM result, 01. Now V1 also knows his qubit 6 is entangled with P’s qubit 4 in the Bell state 10. 
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4). Both V0 and V1 encode a 2-bit message on their qubits 1 and 6 respectively, through super dense 
coding [17], and send their encoded qubits to P simultaneously through public channels. 
5). P retrieves the encoded 2-bit message by performing BSM on Bell pairs (1, 2) and (4, 6) and 
immediately sends messages to V0 and V1 through classical channels.  
6) V0 and V1 can verify the position of P by comparing the arrival time of response.  
Again this scheme assumes that channel between distant verifiers is secure which is not a realistic 
scenario.  In other case, eavesdroppers can intercept and get BSM result of V0, 01. So they will also be 
able to know that V1 and P have entangled qubit pair in the state 10. Furthermore, eavesdroppers can 
intercept qubits sent from V0 and V1 and find encoded 2-bit message. The cheating strategy for this 
scheme is shown in figure 2 and is described below:  
1). V0 shares two entangled qubit pairs (1, 2) and (3, 4) with the prover P, in one of the four Bell states, 
for instance both in 00. Suppose he also shares an entangled qubit pair (5, 6) with Bob in the Bell state 11. 
Moreover, suppose eavesdropper E0 lying between V0 and P possesses entangled qubit pair (7, 8) in Bell 
state 00 while eavesdropper E1 lying between V1 and P have entangled qubit pair (9, 10) in Bell state 00.  
2). V0 performs a Bell state measurement on qubits 3 and 5 and gets one of the Bell states, say 01. This 
measurement projects the qubits 4 and 6 into 10, only known to V0.   
3). V0 communicates with V1 through an insecure public channel and informs him about his BSM result, 
01. Now V1 also knows his qubit 6 is entangled with P’s qubit 4 in the state 10. Eavesdroppers intercept 
and also get this information. 
4). Let V0 encodes a 2-bit message 10 on his qubit 1 and V1 encodes a 2-bit message 11 on his qubit 6 
respectively, through super dense coding, and send their encoded qubits to P simultaneously through 
public channels. E0 and E1 intercept these qubits and send their qubits 7 and 9 respectively to P. 
5). P performs BSM on Bell pairs (7, 2) and (9, 4) and immediately sends his BSM results 01 to V0 and 
10 to V1 through classical channels. E0 and E1 intercept these results, perform BSM on their retained 
qubits (both 11 say) and they will know 2-bit secret messages of V0 (10) and V1 (11). While decoded 
message by P will be wrong for sure. Eavesdroppers can jam the signals of p and send exact 2-bit 
messages to V0 and V1.  
6) V0 and V1 will verify the position of P, as if no adversary has happened, by comparing the arrival time 
of response.  
 
Figure 2: Cheating scheme for QPV scheme-IV. 
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Thus measurement results and times of V0 and V1 are consistent as if no adversary has happened.  
Moreover, both V0 and V1 cannot detect the presence of adversaries in this scheme. Hence, eavesdroppers 
cheat the prover and verifiers without being detected.  
 
5. Our quantum position-verification schemes 
In this work, we propose quantum position-verification schemes under the more realistic and 
cryptographically standard assumptions. We assume that the position of the honest prover and reference 
stations are secure from adversary; enabling them to store and hide the quantum data and process. We 
also assume that the reference stations are trusted and known to each other. However, quantum/classical 
channels are not secure; neither between the prover and verifiers nor between different verifiers. 
Moreover, there is no bound on storage, computing, receiving and transmitting powers of eavesdroppers. 
In short, eavesdroppers have full control of environment except prover’s position and reference stations. 
We also assume that all reference stations and the prover has fixed position in Minkowski space-time 
where all verifiers have précised and synchronized clocks. Finally, we suppose that signals can be sent 
between prover and reference stations at the speed of light. While the time for information processing at 
position of the honest prover and reference stations is negligible.  For simplicity, we will discuss our 
schemes for one honest prover P and two verifiers V0 and V1 at distant reference stations R0 and R1 such 
that the prover is at a distance d from both reference stations. 
 
5.1. QPV scheme-A 
This scheme is shown in figure 3 and its explicit procedure follows: 
1). V0 shares two entangled qubit pairs (2, 5) and (3, 7) with the prover P, in one of the four Bell states, 
for instance both in 01. Let she also shares two entangled qubit pairs (1, 9) and (4,12) with Bob in the 
Bell state 11. V1 also shares two entangled qubit pairs (6, 10) and (8, 11) with the prover P, in one of the 
four Bell states, for instance both in 01. All this information is public.  
 
Figure 3: Bell states written as uiuj are public. The states (uiuj) are known to V0 only while [uiuj] are 
known to V1 only. {uiuj} are known to both P and V0 while ׀uiuj׀are known to P and V1.  
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2). V0 performs a Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and 2 and gets one of the Bell states, say 10. This 
measurement projects the qubits 5 and 9 into Bell state 00, only known to V0. Similarly V1 also performs 
a BSM on qubits 11 and 12 and gets one of the Bell states, say 00. This measurement projects the qubits 4 
and 8 into Bell state 10, only known to V1.   
3). V0 performs BSM on 3 and 4 and announces result publically, say 11. At this point only V1 knows that 
the BSM result of P on 7 and 8 will be 00. Concurrently, V1 performs BSM on 9 and 10 and announces 
result publically, say 10. At this point only V0 knows that the BSM result of P on 5 and 6 will be 11. 
4). At time t=0, V0 sends an encoded message to P such that this message can only be decoded with secret 
2-bits 11, only known to V0 and P. simultaneously V1 sends an encoded message to P such that this 
message can only be decoded with secret 2-bits 00, only known to V1 and P. 
5). P retrieves the encoded message with corresponding secret 2-bits, obtained by performing BSM on 
Bell pairs (5, 6) and (7, 8). He immediately sends messages to V0 and V1.  
6) V0 and V1 can verify the position of P by comparing the arrival time of response, t = 2d/c.  
If verifiers verify the position of P by performing this scheme N time successively, P is identified 
and his position is authenticated. In this scheme, no secret information is sent publically without properly 
encoding. The encoded message can only be decoded by P having secret 2-bits.  
 
5.2. QPV scheme-B 
This scheme is shown in figure 4 and follows: 
1). V0 possesses an entangled qubit pair (1, 2) in Bell state 11 and also shares an entangled qubit pair     
(3, 4), in Bell state 01, with the prover P. V1 also possesses an entangled qubit pair (11,12) in Bell state 11 
and shares an entangled qubit pair (9, 10), in Bell state 01, with the prover P. The prover P possesses two 
entangled qubit pairs (5,6) and (7,8) both in the bell state 00, say. All this information is public.  
2). V0, P and V1 perform simultaneously BSM as follows: V0 on qubits 2 and 3, P on qubits 4 and 6, and 8 
and 9 while V1 on 10 and 12 respectively. Their BSM results will be known only to them at this stage, for 
example, 01 to V0, 11 and 01 to P and 10 to V1. Moreover, these measurements will project the qubits 1 
and 5 into 00, and 7 and 11 into 01 as shown in figure below. These results will be unknown to everyone. 
 
 
Figure 4: Bell states written as uiuj are public. The states (uiuj) are known to V0 only, [uiuj] are known to 
V1 only while <uiuj> are known to P only. {uiuj} are known to both P and V0 and ׀uiuj׀ are known to P and 
V1. While ]uiuj[ are unknown to everyone.  
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3). V0 and V1 send their qubits 1 and 11 to P simultaneously. P performs BSM on pairs (1,5) and (7,11) 
and immediately sends corresponding BSM results 00 and 01 to V0 and V1 respectively.  
4). V0 and V1 note round trip time and now they will be aware of corresponding P’s BSM results 11 and 
01 respectively. Similarly P will be aware of corresponding BSM results of V0 and V1, that is, 01 and 10.  
5) V0 sends an encoded message to P such that this message can only be decoded with secret 2-bits 11, 
only known to V0 and P. simultaneously V1 sends an encoded message to P such that this message can 
only be decoded with secret 2-bits 01, only known to V1 and P. 
6). Only P can retrieve the encoded message by corresponding secret 2-bits. He again encode the same 
message such that only V0 and V1 can decode it with their secret 2-bits and immediately sends messages 
to V0 and V1.  
7) V0 and V1 can verify the position of P by validating messages and comparing round trip time, t = 2d/c.  
By using single QPV scheme, verifiers can verify position of p twice; in step 4 and 7. On either 
stage, if they get wrong response from P, they can detect eavesdroppers in the middle. If verifiers verify 
the position of P by performing this scheme N time successively, P is identified and his position is 
authenticated. In both QPV schemes A and B, secret messages can be encoded on qubits by applying 
arbitrary rotations.  
 
6. Key establishment in PBQC 
If position of the prover P is verified N times successively, each verifier will have established two 
different secret keys of length 2N with P, that is,  
                                                          
{ }NV vvvK 221 .....,.........,=                                                             (6.1) 
and  
                                                         
{ }NP pppK 221 .....,.........,=                                                            (6.2) 
where [ ]1,0, ∈ii pv . In our QPV scheme-A, both of the keys KV and KP will be known to corresponding 
verifiers but the prover will know only one of these, KP. However, in our QPV scheme-B, both of the 
keys KV and KP will be known to the prover and corresponding verifiers. These keys can be used further 
for identification of the prover and authentication of the message transferred. Our position-based key 
establishment is similar to the one proposed by A. K. Ekert [18] based on shared entanglement states but 
different in the sense that verifiers and the prover perform BSM on entangled pairs instead of 
measurement on single entangled particle. A. Cabello also proposed quantum key distribution scheme 
based on entanglement swapping where distant parties transfer entangled particles through public 
channels instead of pre-shared entangled states [19]. Eavesdropping attack on Cabello’s scheme and 
further modifications to attain security can be found in following references [20,21].  
  
7. Authentication in PBQC 
Authentication is a procedure to verify that received message come from the valid entity and has not been 
altered. Generally authentication can be achieved through following three mechanisms: message 
encryption (symmetric or asymmetric), message Authentication Code (MAC), or hash functions. 
Buhrman et al introduced the idea of position-based authentication; a message authentication code based 
on their position-verification scheme [8]. We will show that our proposed QPV schemes can be used as 
message encryption authentication schemes straightforward. 
In the following position-based authentication, we will use photon as a qubit.  Horizontally 
polarized state of photon will be denoted by 0  while vertically polarized state by 1 .  The scheme 
works as follows:  
1). The prover P chooses a large positive integer z, prepares a 2N-qubit state N20 ⊗=ψ  and generates a 
classical 2N-bit string S = {s1,s2,…….s2N} where si  is any random integer. P encodes string S on 2N 
qubits and sends the state Sψ  to V0: 
                                                              ( ) NiNiS sR 22 1 0 ⊗=⊗= θψ                                                           (7.1) 
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where ( )θisR  is the rotation operator with z4/piθ = . 
2) Verifier V0 chooses a different large positive integer z and generates a classical 2N-bit string T = {t1, 
t2,….t2N} where ti  is any random integer. V0 encodes string T on Sψ  and sends the state STψ  to P: 
                                                        
( ) ( ) NiiNiST sRtR 22 1 0 ⊗=⊗= θθψ                                                    (7.2) 
where ( )θitR  is the rotation operator with z4/piθ = . 
3) P applies rotation ( )θisR −  on the state STψ  and then encrypts message M = {m1,m2,…….m2N}; mi ∈ 
[0,1] with his 2N-bit secret key KP by applying a further rotation ( )[ ]2/piii mpR ⊕  on ith qubit, that is: 
                                                 ( )[ ] ( ) NiiiNiTM tRmpR 22 1 02/ ⊗= ⊕⊗= θpiψ                                           (7.3) 
and sends the state TMψ  back to V0. 
4). To identify the prover P, V0 applies ( )θitR −  on the ith qubit and measures the state 
                                                      ( )[ ] NiiNiM mpR 22 1 02/ ⊗= ⊕⊗= piψ                                                 (7.4) 
in [ ]1,0  basis. He will get ii mp ⊕  where mi can only be retrieved by exact key pi. 
5). V0 execute XOR of ii mp ⊕  and ip . He will get message M = {m1,m2,…….m2N}.  
Simultaneously, all other verifiers can perform same scheme with P. Furthermore, all verifiers can note 
the round trip time of response from P.  
 
 
 
8. Security analysis 
Security of our scheme relies on the fact that no secret information, which could help in spoofing, is sent 
directly through public channels but is encrypted properly such that only prover and verifiers can decrypt 
it. In short, proposed QPV schemes remain secure in general and under known entanglement base attacks 
in particular even if eavesdroppers have infinite amount of pre-shared entanglement and power of non-
local quantum measurements in negligible time.  
In our QPV scheme-A, eavesdroppers cannot obtain any information about the secret 
measurement results of V0, V1 and P through public announcements of V0 and V1. Furthermore, 
eavesdroppers cannot perform intercept/resend or teleportation based attacks because no entangled qubit 
is transferred between the prover and verifiers. Hence, BSM results are known only to the honest prover 
and verifiers and only honest prover can respond to verifiers accurately. The verifiers can easily detect 
adversaries if they try to intercept encrypted communication.  
 Again in our QPV scheme-B, eavesdroppers cannot get any information about secret BSM results 
of verifiers and the prover through public announcements of P or by intercepting qubits 1 and 11 sent by 
V0 and V1 to P over public channels. Suppose eavesdropper between V0 and P possesses already 
entangled qubit pair (13,14), intercepts qubit 1, performs BSM on 1 and 13 and sends qubit 14 to P.  In 
that case, V0 can easily detect eavesdropper because announcements of P will not be consistent with the 
BSM results of V0 and P. When V0 will send encoded messages to P in step (5) of the scheme, surely P 
will decode these messages incorrectly. Similarly P and V1 can detect eavesdropper E1 lying between 
them.  
Finally, our position-based authentication scheme can be made secure by choosing arbitrarily 
large integer z.  If z >> 1 (or θ  << 1), number of non-orthogonal states increases and it becomes 
impossible to differentiate them, that is, distance between nearest neighbors ( ) ( ) 211 θψθψ +− ss  
approaches to zero. Moreover, only one bit of classical information can be obtained from single qubit [22] 
while 2N bits are required to identify any randomly chosen si (or ti) from 2N-bit string S (or T). Hence, 
the encoding applied in step 1 and 2 acts as a quantum one way function provided z >> 1, only authorized 
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users can extract secret information. For detailed discussion of quantum one way function see [23,24]. 
Hence, position-based authentication presented in this paper is secure against known attacks; 
intercept/resend attack, chosen plaintext attack, forward search attack and chosen ciphertext attack.  
 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we review already proposed quantum position-verification schemes based on pre-shared 
data between the prover and verifiers. QPV scheme-I proposed by Kent seems secure but requires pre-
shared classical secret key between the prover and one of verifiers. Scheme-II proposed by Buhrman et al 
is based on pre-shared entangled states between the prover and verifiers but the authors showed that this 
scheme is secure only if eavesdroppers do not have any entangled data. While we have shown that 
schemes-III and IV proposed by R. Malani, also based on pre-shared entangled states between the prover 
and verifiers, are insecure if channels between distant verifiers are not secure.  
We proposed two different quantum position-verification schemes to show information-theoretic 
position-based quantum cryptography is possible even over untrusted networks if the honest prover pre-
shares some entangled states with verifiers. Our schemes have numerous advantages over previously 
proposed schemes in this field. (1). Our proposed schemes are secure even over untrusted networks while 
all previous schemes may be secure only if channels between distant verifiers are secure. (2). Our 
schemes verify the position as well as serves as a protocol for position-based QKD which can be used for 
authentication and communication between the prover and verifiers. However, previously proposed 
schemes cannot be used for secret communication. For example, in scheme IV, adversaries can spoof 
position verification as well as get the secret 2-bits of the verifiers. These bits cannot be reused for further 
communication. (3) Furthermore, in existing scheme IV, verifiers use also classical channels to 
communicate secret information with the prover in case of N shared entangled pair between them [9]. In 
principle, eavesdroppers can always monitor classical channels without being detected by authorized 
users. However, our schemes require only quantum channels while sending secret information. (4) 
Finally, our proposed QPV schemes can easily detect adversaries while previously proposed schemes can 
be spoofed by eavesdroppers without being detected.  
We presented a formulism that verifies position, establishes secret keys and authenticates the 
honest prover using a single scheme in position-based quantum cryptography. Our proposed position-
based authentication scheme can be modified to more robust authentication mechanism based on hash 
functions by using secret keys established in our quantum position-verification schemes.    
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Appendix 
In section 3, we write four Bell sates compactly as 
                                                       
( )
2
1110 j
u
j
uu
uu i
ji
⊕−+
=β                                                 (A.1) 
Where [ ]1,0, ∈ji uu  and ⊕  denotes addition with mod 2. Corresponding four Bell states in 0  and 1  
representation will be 
                                                                
2
1100
00
+
=β                                                                  A.2 
                                                                
2
0110
01
+
=β                                                                   A.3 
                                                               
2
1100
10
−
=β
                                                                 
 A.4 
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2
0110
11
−
=β
                                                 
                 A.5 
Suppose qubit pairs (1,3) and (2,4) are entangled in Bell sates 1301β  and 2400β . Initially, these four 
particles will be in state 
                                        
2
1100
2
1001 24241313
24001301
+
⊗
+
=⊗ ββ                                       A.6 
                    ( )241324132413241324001301 111000101101000121 +++=⊗ ββ                  A.7 
                    ( )341234123412341224001301 011100101101100021 +++=⊗ ββ                  A.8 
By simple algebraic tricks (adding and subtracting terms like 
3412 jiji uuuu  ), we will get 
            
( )3410121134111210340012013401120024001301 21 ββββββββββ −−+==⊗       A.9  
By performing Bell state measurement on particles 1 and 2, Alice can project particles 3 and 4 into one of 
the four possible Bell states; 00β , 01β , 10β or 11β . 
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